Why not just go almost line by line?
His first few lines, Will and Ariel Durant...
I read parts of it when a kid. This is a classic of the Whig Interpretation of History, which I have discussed recently here, the theory of confident and progressive Western history which Brooks likes, and which he laments is dying in America and elsewhere in the West. More on that issue later.
I read parts of it when a kid. This is a classic of the Whig Interpretation of History, which I have discussed recently here, the theory of confident and progressive Western history which Brooks likes, and which he laments is dying in America and elsewhere in the West. More on that issue later.
Next, he says this story of civilization came with certain values, such as reasoned discourse...
Well, what does reasoned discourse really mean; presumably a multitude of diverse and inconsistent things and disciplines, notoriously difficult to get a handle on, bleeds over into ethics, logic, mathematics, history, politics, you name it.
Well, what else did reasoned discourse itself also come with, one might ask? I will tell you: it came with a gnawing sense of skepticism about the powers of reason and perception themselves to see or understand reality in itself.
In other words it reiterated an ancient tradition from the Greek Fifth Century Enlightenment about the elusiveness of knowledge asserted the relativity of all values, traditions, factual truths, and religions.
Well, what does reasoned discourse really mean; presumably a multitude of diverse and inconsistent things and disciplines, notoriously difficult to get a handle on, bleeds over into ethics, logic, mathematics, history, politics, you name it.
Well, what else did reasoned discourse itself also come with, one might ask? I will tell you: it came with a gnawing sense of skepticism about the powers of reason and perception themselves to see or understand reality in itself.
In other words it reiterated an ancient tradition from the Greek Fifth Century Enlightenment about the elusiveness of knowledge asserted the relativity of all values, traditions, factual truths, and religions.
He claims Western Civ set a standard for great statesmanship.
What can he mean? Moral statesmanship, whatever that means? Does he mean ancient Greek and Roman statesmen, Pericles, Alcibiades, Cicero, the Gracchi, Caesar, the ones he likes; good practitioners of raison d'etat; balance of power expertise; Machiavelli, perhaps Bismarck, Richelieu, Hitler? He doesn't say. Wouldn't it also however have correspondingly set a standard for terrible statesmanship? Otherwise, how would one know what great was? So, let's just say that maybe the West set both kinds of standards and all degrees in between.
What can he mean? Moral statesmanship, whatever that means? Does he mean ancient Greek and Roman statesmen, Pericles, Alcibiades, Cicero, the Gracchi, Caesar, the ones he likes; good practitioners of raison d'etat; balance of power expertise; Machiavelli, perhaps Bismarck, Richelieu, Hitler? He doesn't say. Wouldn't it also however have correspondingly set a standard for terrible statesmanship? Otherwise, how would one know what great was? So, let's just say that maybe the West set both kinds of standards and all degrees in between.
He next mentions a town square, and religion, in passing.
Under Brooks' whig interpretation, the Reformation and Counter Reformation were milestones in this Whig narrative of the confident march toward the progress of today. Butterfield described it very well.
Under Brooks' whig interpretation, the Reformation and Counter Reformation were milestones in this Whig narrative of the confident march toward the progress of today. Butterfield described it very well.
Next, he mentions giving diverse people a sense of shared mission, common vocabulary, common goals.
This started out as an aspiration only intended within and among diverse peoples of only the West itself. Even other countries within the West were viewed by each as in a sense barbarians, even into the 19th Century; how much more so, denizens of other civilizations. but this sense of shared mission, common vocabulary and goals, eventually became, by the force of Western ideology itself sua sponte, the dream of some Western liberals in the 18th and 19th centuries to include all people of the world.
This started out as an aspiration only intended within and among diverse peoples of only the West itself. Even other countries within the West were viewed by each as in a sense barbarians, even into the 19th Century; how much more so, denizens of other civilizations. but this sense of shared mission, common vocabulary and goals, eventually became, by the force of Western ideology itself sua sponte, the dream of some Western liberals in the 18th and 19th centuries to include all people of the world.
It had seldom been part of the Western civ concept before that time, except perhaps in terms of early Christianity being spread as a Jewish mission to the gentiles, presumably ultimately to all the gentiles in the world regardless of race religion or civilization. The idea of course had become popular among all religions which sought to convert infidels in conquered lands rather than to kill, enslave, or exile them.
Brooks then explains how this crisis of Western Civ began. It only began several decades ago he says.
I may come back to that point directly at some point below in discussing other points here.
He blames this relatively sudden civilizational crisis on academia, an institution conveniently other than journalism.
He can't very well blame journalism, too, can he?
Journalism's mission, apparently, after all, is presumably not to try to weigh in on such issues with scholarly authority in the first place anyway. Although, isn't that rather what Brooks does here himself in blaming academia, or am I missing something?
Remember that Brooks himself assured us a while back that we had finally, for several decades now (coincidentally, the ostensible length of the evolving civilizational crisis he decries), reached the stage of a meritocracy here in America.
Presumably, however, the emerging meritocracy here would also have some things to do, at some points, with academic excellence and standards, and be somehow connected with a concept of Western civ as itself a meritocratic concept, no?
So, how according to Brooks, are we both finally a meritocracy founded on mainly academic excellence and expertise, and also in a sudden crisis of Western civ brought on by academic waywardness and incompetence? How?
Maybe that is enough for one post, call it chapter one of my remarks on Brooks The Crisis of Western civ.
Brooks then explains how this crisis of Western Civ began. It only began several decades ago he says.
I may come back to that point directly at some point below in discussing other points here.
He blames this relatively sudden civilizational crisis on academia, an institution conveniently other than journalism.
He can't very well blame journalism, too, can he?
Journalism's mission, apparently, after all, is presumably not to try to weigh in on such issues with scholarly authority in the first place anyway. Although, isn't that rather what Brooks does here himself in blaming academia, or am I missing something?
Remember that Brooks himself assured us a while back that we had finally, for several decades now (coincidentally, the ostensible length of the evolving civilizational crisis he decries), reached the stage of a meritocracy here in America.
Presumably, however, the emerging meritocracy here would also have some things to do, at some points, with academic excellence and standards, and be somehow connected with a concept of Western civ as itself a meritocratic concept, no?
So, how according to Brooks, are we both finally a meritocracy founded on mainly academic excellence and expertise, and also in a sudden crisis of Western civ brought on by academic waywardness and incompetence? How?
Maybe that is enough for one post, call it chapter one of my remarks on Brooks The Crisis of Western civ.
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