While a good and interesting article, as far as it goes, the author fails to place the interrogation techniques used on Simon in the wider context of police procedures that were ubiquitous, and unevenly applied.
Catholics, Jews, Muslims, Asians, or even white local citizens, suspected of a crime, would have been treated little or no differently than Simon, and would have been subject to similar mob rule if suspected under similar circumstances.
Their whiteness would have protected them almost as little as Simon's darkness put him at ostensibly greater risk.
Catholics, Jews, Muslims, Asians, or even white local citizens, suspected of a crime, would have been treated little or no differently than Simon, and would have been subject to similar mob rule if suspected under similar circumstances.
Their whiteness would have protected them almost as little as Simon's darkness put him at ostensibly greater risk.
Suspected white cattle rustlers in the West were treated just that way, they were often summarily lynched by a mob, confession or not, all good God fearing white folk.
Notice that Judge Finley chose to ignore fine points of law twice, as recounted in the article. He had not later been reformed by his lesson from the Supreme Court in the Simon case reversal re jury questions.
It is a general point I once made in an article I presented here and there in Florida, touching on rules of evidence, and the role of the judge.
In Florida, back in the 1850s, as now, such questions of law are often, in practice rather than in law books or law classes, passed over by the judge in a ruling and then given to the jury as questions of fact, and seldom are such decisions overturned when appealed.
Also, judges found that they were less likely to be reversed by ruling a matter a question of fact (and thus one for the jury to decide, and out of their hands) than to rule it a question of law (that is, one only for the court to decide) and then guess wrong.
Bobbitt might characterize the judicial reasoning for this type of trial court decision 'prudential', if that makes any sense. He might also have a different category altogether for it.
On the evidence described, it certainly does not look like a mixed question of law and fact, and Simon's lawyer apparently made that quite clear, and provided a lot of law on the point of law itself.
It seems that Simon was better defended than most other litigants, white or black, slave or free, under similar circumstances in a similar place and time.
It makes sense to compare the quality of Simon's defense, as Hardy describes it, to that of the defendant in " To Kill A Mockingbird ", portrayed by Gregory Peck, Jeff Bridges, and others.
Had the case been decided on the law, as it should have been, (as there was apparently no other evidence linking Simon to these crimes elicited) and as the Florida Supreme Court so held, there might not have been a jury verdict from which to appeal, (and would likely not have been one after remand). There might have been an appeal, and a decision on appeal, ruling on a point of law. Finley, as the article notes, was surprised (had certainly reasonably expected his ruling Simon's confession admissible not to be reversed).
There is, still, unbroached in the article, the matter of whether Simon had been, in fact, nevertheless, the actual perpetrator.....
The fact that he gave an erroneous account of where a particular fire began, which was contradicted at trial by defense eye witnesses, is not, itself, much proof at all of Simon's actual innocence, the inference drawn there being that he had guessed wrong.
What if he gave a self serving false account of where a fire started, which might later be used to set aside his confession, even though he was the actual perpetrator? That may be what happened.
Not having read all the background material, I cannot say that the possibility of Simon as the actual perpetrator is foreclosed by the record recounted here.
There may be other issues running around here, based on the account in the article.
Simon's owner urged him to confess and was present. One wonders, in the first place, how Simon had been fingered as the arsonist.
That question, a quite important one, is not answered in the account, and may not appear in existing records.
Why did the owner urge his valuable property to confess to crimes which would surely have robbed him of his investment in Simon anyway, lynch mob or no lynch mob?
What might have been the owner's motive for that drastic step? It is very hard to believe that the mob would have lynched the slaveowner too, unless there is something we are not being told.
What other evidence was there for Simon's guilt not brought forward? Did Simon have a co conspirator, and if so, who? What motive would Simon have had for such a string of attacks? It is hard to imagine a slave having much of a motive.
What about this possibility: Simon was put up to it, ordered even, by someone. He might have been so ordered by his master. It would have been hard for him to have disobeyed, under the circumstances, as hard as refusing to confess, shall we say. In that case, would not the slaveowner urged him not to confess, so that he might be slienced forever by the lynchmob outside?
A smart guilty slaveowner might have taken that route.
So, why did slaveowner urge confession. Maybe the answer is that some among the mob were slaveowner's rivals or enemies somehow, and even suspected slaveowner had ordered Simon to torch these sites for slaveowner's reasons, rational or irrational.
Let's just put it this way: Under these conditions, if Simon confessed, he was a dead man, and if he refused to confess, he was a dead man. A Morton's Fork.
The three justice Florida Supreme Court panel, which reversed J Finley's erroneous ruling giving the matter of Simon's confession to the jury, and themselves thereby ruled against four different groups of white racist victims of arson, in favor of Simon, a convicted negro slave, were all prominent slave owning racist lawyers, more than one from the North, not the South, who later all became significant figures in the Confederacy.
Simon died in prison, February 1854.
Lincoln went back into politics, 1854.
Dred Scott decision, 1857.
Many other important events, 1850s.
Notice that Judge Finley chose to ignore fine points of law twice, as recounted in the article. He had not later been reformed by his lesson from the Supreme Court in the Simon case reversal re jury questions.
It is a general point I once made in an article I presented here and there in Florida, touching on rules of evidence, and the role of the judge.
In Florida, back in the 1850s, as now, such questions of law are often, in practice rather than in law books or law classes, passed over by the judge in a ruling and then given to the jury as questions of fact, and seldom are such decisions overturned when appealed.
Also, judges found that they were less likely to be reversed by ruling a matter a question of fact (and thus one for the jury to decide, and out of their hands) than to rule it a question of law (that is, one only for the court to decide) and then guess wrong.
Bobbitt might characterize the judicial reasoning for this type of trial court decision 'prudential', if that makes any sense. He might also have a different category altogether for it.
On the evidence described, it certainly does not look like a mixed question of law and fact, and Simon's lawyer apparently made that quite clear, and provided a lot of law on the point of law itself.
It seems that Simon was better defended than most other litigants, white or black, slave or free, under similar circumstances in a similar place and time.
It makes sense to compare the quality of Simon's defense, as Hardy describes it, to that of the defendant in " To Kill A Mockingbird ", portrayed by Gregory Peck, Jeff Bridges, and others.
Had the case been decided on the law, as it should have been, (as there was apparently no other evidence linking Simon to these crimes elicited) and as the Florida Supreme Court so held, there might not have been a jury verdict from which to appeal, (and would likely not have been one after remand). There might have been an appeal, and a decision on appeal, ruling on a point of law. Finley, as the article notes, was surprised (had certainly reasonably expected his ruling Simon's confession admissible not to be reversed).
There is, still, unbroached in the article, the matter of whether Simon had been, in fact, nevertheless, the actual perpetrator.....
The fact that he gave an erroneous account of where a particular fire began, which was contradicted at trial by defense eye witnesses, is not, itself, much proof at all of Simon's actual innocence, the inference drawn there being that he had guessed wrong.
What if he gave a self serving false account of where a fire started, which might later be used to set aside his confession, even though he was the actual perpetrator? That may be what happened.
Not having read all the background material, I cannot say that the possibility of Simon as the actual perpetrator is foreclosed by the record recounted here.
There may be other issues running around here, based on the account in the article.
Simon's owner urged him to confess and was present. One wonders, in the first place, how Simon had been fingered as the arsonist.
That question, a quite important one, is not answered in the account, and may not appear in existing records.
Why did the owner urge his valuable property to confess to crimes which would surely have robbed him of his investment in Simon anyway, lynch mob or no lynch mob?
What might have been the owner's motive for that drastic step? It is very hard to believe that the mob would have lynched the slaveowner too, unless there is something we are not being told.
What other evidence was there for Simon's guilt not brought forward? Did Simon have a co conspirator, and if so, who? What motive would Simon have had for such a string of attacks? It is hard to imagine a slave having much of a motive.
What about this possibility: Simon was put up to it, ordered even, by someone. He might have been so ordered by his master. It would have been hard for him to have disobeyed, under the circumstances, as hard as refusing to confess, shall we say. In that case, would not the slaveowner urged him not to confess, so that he might be slienced forever by the lynchmob outside?
A smart guilty slaveowner might have taken that route.
So, why did slaveowner urge confession. Maybe the answer is that some among the mob were slaveowner's rivals or enemies somehow, and even suspected slaveowner had ordered Simon to torch these sites for slaveowner's reasons, rational or irrational.
Let's just put it this way: Under these conditions, if Simon confessed, he was a dead man, and if he refused to confess, he was a dead man. A Morton's Fork.
The three justice Florida Supreme Court panel, which reversed J Finley's erroneous ruling giving the matter of Simon's confession to the jury, and themselves thereby ruled against four different groups of white racist victims of arson, in favor of Simon, a convicted negro slave, were all prominent slave owning racist lawyers, more than one from the North, not the South, who later all became significant figures in the Confederacy.
Simon died in prison, February 1854.
Lincoln went back into politics, 1854.
Dred Scott decision, 1857.
Many other important events, 1850s.
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