Sunday, August 23, 2020
Professor:
(Maybe this DK post is, in a way, a commemoration of the 80th anniversary, on August 21st, of Trotsky's assasination, but he didn't want to put it quite that way.... "...And at the very bottom of the page, the Times reported that Sylvia Ageloff, a 31-year old Brooklynite who worked as a Department of Welfare home relief investigator--presumably a state agency--had been identified as the woman who had introduced Leon Trotsky to has assassin in Mexico, where she had gone during a three-month leave of absence from her job. As it turned out, Mexican authorities initially charged her with complicity in the murder but later released her..." DK. Another question might be, which side, if any, is DK on, re Trotsky: Trotsky or Stalin? He would have to answer that one. How many CPUSA, Soviet agents, and Soviet illegals were working for the NYT, in 1940? Trust me, it was rifled with them.)
Andrew, above, tried, for whatever reasons, to deny that Hopkins was a Soviet agent. The evidence goes strongly the other way.
FN:
So why would so knowledgeable a historian as Andrew quite possibly be dissembling, if he is, about Hopkins as a Soviet agent, even at that late date?
And assuming dissembling for a moment, why then use so farcical an account and go so over the top really as to characterize Hopkins as an American patriot? It really is a sort of tip off that he is lying here. Why do that, too?
Well, it is rather like saying that the Earl of Oxford was the best at comedy at Elizabeth's Court, but he was not Shakespeare. That working class hero and British patriot was the man from Stratford.
What a difference 80 years can make.
Re Sylvia Ageloff, just going through a few books sitting around here.
(Maybe this DK post is, in a way, a commemoration of the 80th anniversary, on August 21st, of Trotsky's assasination, but he didn't want to put it quite that way.... "...And at the very bottom of the page, the Times reported that Sylvia Ageloff, a 31-year old Brooklynite who worked as a Department of Welfare home relief investigator--presumably a state agency--had been identified as the woman who had introduced Leon Trotsky to has assassin in Mexico, where she had gone during a three-month leave of absence from her job. As it turned out, Mexican authorities initially charged her with complicity in the murder but later released her..." DK. Another question might be, which side, if any, is DK on, re Trotsky: Trotsky or Stalin? He would have to answer that one. How many CPUSA, Soviet agents, and Soviet illegals were working for the NYT, in 1940? Trust me, it was rifled with them.)
Here are a few references:
The Sword and the Shield, The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB, p. 86; The Venona Secrets, p. 337-354; Ramon Mercador, Honey Trapping, Wikipedia.
Mercador was the honey trap for Ageloff.
Mercador was the honey trap for Ageloff.
Re Lend-Lease, it is useful to look at the role played by Hopkins, who ran it. See the above works on that subject as well. Indexes: Hopkins; Also, McJimsey, Harry Hopkins, Ally of the Poor and Defender of Democracy.
Andrew, above, tried, for whatever reasons, to deny that Hopkins was a Soviet agent. The evidence goes strongly the other way.
All the best
FN:
See Stalin's Secret Agents, p. 120, for their criticism of Andrew's role in this matter. Andrew not merely softened the Soviet secret service's disclosures regarding Hopkins, but went much further and characterized him as an "American patriot". Few more ironic terms might be used by a knowledgeable British historian. I will add here that Andrew was not just any historian, but rather served as the Chairman of the Department at Cambridge.
So why would so knowledgeable a historian as Andrew quite possibly be dissembling, if he is, about Hopkins as a Soviet agent, even at that late date?
And assuming dissembling for a moment, why then use so farcical an account and go so over the top really as to characterize Hopkins as an American patriot? It really is a sort of tip off that he is lying here. Why do that, too?
Well, it is rather like saying that the Earl of Oxford was the best at comedy at Elizabeth's Court, but he was not Shakespeare. That working class hero and British patriot was the man from Stratford.
One quite possible reason occurs to me.............
Andrew knew, because he was, after all, the historian for the British Secret Service, and the Chair of the History Department at Cambridge, and the British would still like for the Americans not to know, even now, that they had known after all that Hopkins had been a soviet agent, all along.
Further, Burns must have been acting in more than one capacity in working with Hopkins, as Hopkins was also doing himself.
That is my strong suspicion, given the importance of Lend-Lease for Europe, China, Russia, and England.
That is my strong suspicion, given the importance of Lend-Lease for Europe, China, Russia, and England.
Andrew might not want to have admitted that Burns was a British agent as well as a military General.
It does seem strange that Hopkins wanted to work closely only with Burns re British interests re Lend-Lease, according to McJimsey.
If Britain knew Hopkins was a Soviet agent, they had to find it out somehow.
Here is a note of a meeting scheduled for Hopkins with Lauchlin Currie, and Burns, in Washington. See also, the above books, Index, Lauchlin Currie, Wikipedia, as a Soviet agent.
If you read the State Department Historian passage below, you will be astounded to see that Hopkins had deputised General Burns to act on Hopkins' behalf in his absence regarding the needs of China under Lend Lease! Burns was not an American.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1941v05/d652
Memorandum by Mr. Lynn R. Edminster, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
[Washington,] March 27, 1941.
By pre-arrangement I attended the conference called by General Burns24 in his office (Room 2050, Munitions Building) at 3 p.m. today at which Mr. T. V. Soong, purchasing agent for the Chinese Government, was scheduled to present the needs of the Chinese Government for supplies from this country which might be furnished under the Lend-Lease Act. I may say, parenthetically, that Harry Hopkins25 had requested General Burns, acting on his behalf during his absence, to get in touch with the Chinese to see what their needs were; and that General Burns had suggested that I be present from the State Department in my capacity as liaison officer for the Department in connection with the working out of detailed plans for the administration of the Lend-Lease Act.
General Burns had also invited Lauchlin Currie, the President’s assistant, to attend the meeting in order that the views resulting from his recent trip to China and his study of the Chinese situation might also be made available to the group. Mr. Currie was detained, however, and was not present during the discussion.
General Burns asked Mr. Soong what the Chinese needed most at this time. Mr. Soong had not brought a detailed list with him, stating that he would submit the complete list later. He stated orally, however, that they were in great need of planes, arsenal materials (steel, etc.), ordinance [sic], signal equipment, motor transport, cargo transport for the Burma Road, and shipping space on American ships plying directly to Rangoon via the Pacific. In connection with shipping, Mr. Soong pointed out that the planes now being shipped to China are now going on Norwegian vessels via the South Atlantic, the Cape of Good Hope, etc., to Rangoon, and that this involves, among other [Page 618]obstacles, fully two weeks’ delay as against the other route. Moreover, it is becoming increasingly difficult to get foreign shipping space. His suggestion is that planes and materials desired should be shipped directly on American boats across the Pacific.
While the group was waiting for Mr. Currie, who had telephoned that he would be late arriving, General Burns asked Mr. Soong a great many questions with regard to the whole strategic situation in China and in the Far East generally. In answer to specific questions, Mr. Soong said that, whereas most of their munitions and military supplies had come originally from Germany with considerable additional supplies from Russia, those from Germany were now cut off on account of Japan’s joining the Axis, but that considerable supplies were still coming in from Russia, some munitions and also some airplanes of very good quality. He said that, whereas Chinese losses during the early part of the hostilities with Japan had been in the ratio of about 3 to 1, they were now about on an even basis, owing to the long line of communications which Japan had to defend and the greater hazards all around which they confronted as a result of the present strategic situation. He said that Japan had lost about 1,000,000 men, China about 2,000,000. He said that it required about 1,000,000 Japanese soldiers to maintain the present lines of Japan in China, an additional 200,000 or 300,000 soldiers on the Russian border, and a great many more in Korea and various other areas that Japan had to police, all in addition to the maintenance of a considerable reserve force at home.
Asked by General Burns whether he thought that Japan wanted to fight the United States, Mr. Soong replied that she did not want to do so under present conditions but that, if Britain should be defeated or British defeat be so imminent as to warrant the gamble, Japan would, in his opinion, immediately undertake to capture Singapore, even if it meant war with the United States. He said that Japan would almost certainly conclude that, with Britain defeated or near defeat, the United States would be so concerned with the protection of the Atlantic approaches to this hemisphere that it would not feel that it could risk involving its fleet in war with Japan for the protection of Singapore. He stated most emphatically, in reply to a question from General Burns, that, in his opinion, Japan’s capture of Singapore would be a fatal blow to American, British, and Dutch interests in the Far East and that, once established there, it would be next to impossible to dislodge her.
In thus calling attention to some of the high points in the conversation which took place between Mr. Soong and General Burns, I am merely setting them down as a matter of record. No doubt this is all very familiar to those who have specialized on Far Eastern questions.
[Page 619]
When it appeared that Mr. Currie was not going to arrive in time to join in the discussion, General Burns suggested that we meet again at 11 a.m. on Monday, March 30, at which time Mr. Soong would present the detailed list of the items which China would like to have furnished to her for the prosecution of her war efforts. As we were coming out of the building, we encountered Mr. Currie just going in, but we did not return to General Burns’ office with him. Mr. Currie stated that he would endeavor to be present at the meeting on Monday.
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