Kennan (1960s re 1900 ish, and later, until Mao):
"Out of all these ingredients there was brewed the curious view of China that seems to have animated American statesmanship during the war; the picture of a helpless, deserving nation, for whose virtues we alone, among the great powers, had understanding, whose interests we had to sponsor in the face of Japanese enmity and British callousness, and whose grateful support in the postwar period we could take for granted as a mainstay of the world position we hoped to occupy. China was, in fact, and on this we insisted with a most extraordinary vehemence, to be one of the future great powers--- one of what F.D.R. called the 'four world policemen'"
"In this highly subjective picture of the Chinese, there was no room for a whole series of historical and psychological realities. There was no room for the physical ruthlessness that had characterized Chinese political life generally in recent decades; for the formidable psychological and political powers of the Chinese people themselves; for the strong streak of xenophobia in their nature; for the lessons of the Boxer Rebellion; for the extraordinary exploitative talent shown by Chinese factions, at all times, in turning outside aid to domestic political advantage."
"It was this idealized view of the Chinese, rather than any illusions about the relationship between the National Government and the Chinese Communists, which was most damaging to our Far Eastern policy. We did, to be sure, underrate the depth of the antagonism between these two elements. Our memories of what had transpired in 1927 were certainly shorter (if they existed at all) than were those of Mao and Chiang and Stalin. There also seems to me to have been a certain naivete, but nothing worse, in our efforts to bring about a political compromise between these two factions, and to induce Stalin to join us in this effort....". Russia and The West Under Lenin And Stalin, p 374.
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