Tuesday, February 22, 2011
E H CARR WHAT IS HISTORY LINEAR VERSUS CYCLICAL PASSAGE
He has some very useful suggestions re what to look at first, re history, historians, and their theories.
Also some very amusing observations re Butterfield's 'deutero' phase, The Englishman And His History, Whiggish, and contra his critical The Whig Interpretation of History, written in his 'proto' phase.
Carr's views here re linear versus cyclical are also helpful, if not slavishly followed.
Reprising British history in the 19th Century and into the 20th:
"...it was full of meaning... so long as it seemed to be going our way...now that it has taken a wrong turning, belief in the meaning of history has become a heresy...After the First World War, Toynbee made a desperate attempt to replace a linear view of history by a cyclical theory--the characteristic ideology of a society in decline. (fn.2 Marcus Aurelius....Toynbee took the idea from Spengler's Decline of the West.) Since Toynbee's failure, British historians have for the most part been content to throw in their hands and declare that there is no general pattern in history at all." pb, p. 52.
One might draw some critical implications, limitations if you will, for cyclical generational theories, from Carr's perspective.
Re references to the rise and fall of empires, a quote, although somewhat dated now, given the rise of China development since it was published, from Friedman and LeBard, The Coming War..., quoted also in Chalmers Johnson, Japan: Who Governs?, may also be apt, to connect an otherwise abstruse topic to others found in profusion on this site re the US and competitiveness:
"'It is easier (for the U.S.) to force Japan to limit its exports of cars to the U.S. and to increase its purchases of U.S. cars than to increase the efficiency of Detroit. This is the trap of empire. Empire is first won by the most efficient and industrious. It is then maintained by political and military efforts, not economic efficiency. Thus, economics atrophy while armies and navies grow. This military power is used to transfer wealth from colonies and allies, rather than going to the political effort of rebuilding the domestic economy. At each point, the imperialist power has a choice of solving an economic crisis through internal effort or increased exploitation. The latter, being the path of least resistance, is the usual choice. The result is frequently a vast military force with a hollow socio-economic center, an empire in collapse.' Friedman, LeBard, p. 401.
This view of course owes a great deal to Paul Kennedy's Rise and Fall of the Great Powers...." Johnson, p. 322.
Johnson espouses industrial policy, but not also coupled with protectionism for it, at p. 322,
which seems to me rather to ignore the loud and clear implications of the developmental state phenomenon of which he nevertheless has been foremost in chronicling. See also his MITI.
Term search many other terms.
Also some very amusing observations re Butterfield's 'deutero' phase, The Englishman And His History, Whiggish, and contra his critical The Whig Interpretation of History, written in his 'proto' phase.
Carr's views here re linear versus cyclical are also helpful, if not slavishly followed.
Reprising British history in the 19th Century and into the 20th:
"...it was full of meaning... so long as it seemed to be going our way...now that it has taken a wrong turning, belief in the meaning of history has become a heresy...After the First World War, Toynbee made a desperate attempt to replace a linear view of history by a cyclical theory--the characteristic ideology of a society in decline. (fn.2 Marcus Aurelius....Toynbee took the idea from Spengler's Decline of the West.) Since Toynbee's failure, British historians have for the most part been content to throw in their hands and declare that there is no general pattern in history at all." pb, p. 52.
One might draw some critical implications, limitations if you will, for cyclical generational theories, from Carr's perspective.
Re references to the rise and fall of empires, a quote, although somewhat dated now, given the rise of China development since it was published, from Friedman and LeBard, The Coming War..., quoted also in Chalmers Johnson, Japan: Who Governs?, may also be apt, to connect an otherwise abstruse topic to others found in profusion on this site re the US and competitiveness:
"'It is easier (for the U.S.) to force Japan to limit its exports of cars to the U.S. and to increase its purchases of U.S. cars than to increase the efficiency of Detroit. This is the trap of empire. Empire is first won by the most efficient and industrious. It is then maintained by political and military efforts, not economic efficiency. Thus, economics atrophy while armies and navies grow. This military power is used to transfer wealth from colonies and allies, rather than going to the political effort of rebuilding the domestic economy. At each point, the imperialist power has a choice of solving an economic crisis through internal effort or increased exploitation. The latter, being the path of least resistance, is the usual choice. The result is frequently a vast military force with a hollow socio-economic center, an empire in collapse.' Friedman, LeBard, p. 401.
This view of course owes a great deal to Paul Kennedy's Rise and Fall of the Great Powers...." Johnson, p. 322.
Johnson espouses industrial policy, but not also coupled with protectionism for it, at p. 322,
which seems to me rather to ignore the loud and clear implications of the developmental state phenomenon of which he nevertheless has been foremost in chronicling. See also his MITI.
Term search many other terms.
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