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Sunday, July 1, 2018

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PROBLEMS OF CITIZENSHIP RE DRED SCOTT ETC ETC ETC MS ORLECK'S ELUCIDATION

By Annelise Orleck, Professor of History, Dartmouth College

Who Deserves To Be Called an American Citizen?

Most textbook histories of the U.S. portray a vibrant participatory democracy with a long tradition of extending citizenship rights broadly across an unusually diverse population. Some of these texts acknowledge that—at the time when the Constitution was being written—only property-owning white men were considered full citizens and that they constituted a relatively small percentage of the total population of the new United States. From that time forward, however, most U.S. history textbooks trace a progressive arc over the next 200 years during which citizenship rights were extended to an ever broader cross-section of Americans. In the 1830s, the vote was extended to all white men, in 1868 to black men, in 1920 to women, in 1972 to eighteen year olds, and so on. In many texts, the progressive expansion of citizenship rights seems almost to have a life of its own, leading inexorably toward a fully egalitarian present day, when all who reside in the U.S. are entitled to the same rights and protections.
There is truth in these arguments. The U.S. has, at various points in its history, led the world in the breadth of its extension of full citizenship rights, and the past 220 years have seen dramatic expansion in the numbers and kinds of people who have access to those rights. But it is not true that expansions of citizenship rights came easily or naturally. There were stark inequities enshrined in U.S. law and custom from the earliest days of the republic that excluded large swaths of the population from enjoying the full rights and protections of citizenship. The Constitution granted enslaved African Americans the status of 3/5 of a person for the purposes of calculating representation in Congress but did not grant them the right to liberty, property or the vote. And the first legal regulations of who could become a U.S. citizen drew sharp restrictions based on race. The 1790 Alien Naturalization Act warned immigrants that non-whites could never be Americans. Only "a free white person, who shall have resided within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States for the term of two years, may be admitted to become a citizen therof,"
These legal restrictions both drew on and reinforced popular beliefs and prejudices about just who was entitled to call himself an American citizen. (I use the male pronoun intentionally here.) As a result, every expansion of citizenship rights in American history has been the product of fierce and extended political struggle. It took 72 years of sustained political struggle for women to win the right to vote and a century of civil rights activism by African Americans after the end of slavery to overturn Jim Crow segregation laws in the South. Part of reason these movements had to struggle for so long was that they were laboring on two fronts—first to change restrictive laws but also to overcome fierce opposition from many sectors of the American population.
Resistance to expanding the body of those considered full U.S. citizens has been there since the very first debates over the Constitution in 1787. From that day to this, it has been driven by several powerful forces. The first has been prejudice, in particular, race, class, and gender prejudices on the part of those who have written American laws and government policies. Their ranks have, after all, been made up until very recently almost entirely of the first group to have been considered full citizens—propertied white men. Not all of these propertied white male lawmakers have displayed overt prejudice, nor have all of those who did write laws that restricted citizenship rights. But, as historian Alice Kessler-Harris has argued, even lawmakers who did not believe that citizenship should be restricted were affected by ideas about gender, race and class in ways that limited their policymaking imaginations. In other words, they simply did not see women, people of color, or the poor when they were handing out the entitlements of citizenship.
So we might call the second major obstacle to expanding citizenship rights race, class, and gender blinders on the political imagination. One of the most important examples of this can be found in the Social Security Act of 1935, which created the modern social safety net that most American citizens take for granted. Its extension of old-age pensions to American citizens was based on a person’s history of paid employment. Those who earned the most and worked most steadily over the longest period of time were granted the highest pensions. These tended to be white men. On the other hand, the fields that employed the vast majority of women of color—agricultural and domestic labor—were not covered at all. The unpaid domestic and reproductive labor of wives was also excluded from coverage, entitling women who did not work outside the home only to a minimal pension. (If they became widowed they could claim their husband’s pension, which many women did.) The Social Security Act also discriminated against those at the bottom of the labor scale—including millions of African Americans, Mexican Americans, Asian Americans and recent immigrants from Europe—who moved from one job to another. They often did not work at the same job long enough to be covered by Social Security. At the time of the law’s passage, one black leader commented that the law had created a “safety net with holes just big enough for most negroes in the U.S. to fall through.” This was equally true for an awful lot of women.
Popular resistance to extensions of citizenship rights in the U.S. has also been driven by the belief of many Americans that rights are a zero sum game. In other words, the more people who are allowed to exercise full citizenship rights, the less valuable those rights are. And so, in every era that has seen a movement to extend rights to a group that has been previously disfranchised, there have been counter-movements among those who already enjoyed those rights arguing that, to extend them to a new group, would somehow erode the value of those rights. This was true in the 1830s when property qualifications for voting were removed. It was true in the early 20th century when momentum to grant the vote to women was building. This argument was most recently heard in the political battle over whether Vermont (and other states) should allow same-sex partners to marry. If same- sex partners were allowed to marry, opponents argued, it would somehow destabilize and diminish the status of heterosexual marriages. This belief that rights are a zero sum game is no more rational than arguments based on prejudice. But, as sociologist Evelyn Nakano Glenn has shown, it has deep roots in American history.
Another argument against expansion of citizenship rights has been that “natural law” or “religious law” should supersede claims for political rights. Women, it was argued through the early 20th century, should not be given the right to vote because it was seen as “unnatural” and against the intentions of God. One young woman worker on strike during the winter of 1909-10 for higher pay and safer working conditions was arrested and dragged before a judge who, sentencing her to jail time, informed her that she was “on strike against God and Nature.” Similar arguments have been made more recently against extending employment and marriage rights to gay people.
Groups demanding full citizenship rights have often been cast as greedy. African Americans, women, gay people—according to this logic—do not deserve equal rights with other groups because they have not earned full citizenship status. Opponents cast them as whiners asking for “special rights” that would give them unfair advantages over white people, men, or heterosexuals. The two arenas in which this argument has been most commonly made over the past 40 years has been in protests or lawsuits against Affirmative Action policies in hiring and education, and in referenda seeking to overturn or block passage of legal statutes banning discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or sexual orientation.
Against spirited and often violent opposition, organized movements—by women, African Americans, Asian Americans, Native Americans, Hispanic Americans, gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered Americans, and disabled Americans—to extend full citizenship rights have slowly expanded legal and popular understandings of who is an American citizen entitled to full protections and benefits. What follows is a brief history of how citizenship rights have come to be extended to several groups—African Americans, Native Americans, Asian Americans and women—who were denied them for a very long time.

A Brief History of Expansions and Contractions of Citizenship Rights

So what about the narrative of steadily expanding rights? It is true that the number of people who were eligible to vote in the U.S. grew dramatically during the 1820s when property qualifications were lifted. The numbers of voters grew even more dramatically with the arrival of millions of new immigrants during the 19th century. The restrictions enacted in 1790 as to who could become an American citizen were tightened before they were loosened. The Immigration Acts of 1795 and 1798 increased residency requirements from two years to fifteen before an alien could claim citizenship, and gave the president the right to deport aliens who were seen as politically dangerous. But President Thomas Jefferson loosened these restrictions in 1802, reducing the period of necessary residence for white immigrants seeking citizenship to five years—opening up the way for the arrival of 5 million immigrants between 1821 and 1860, mostly from Ireland and Germany. Though many would ultimately return to their home countries, a great many more would become citizens of the U.S., transforming the American population with this first infusion of large numbers of poor, Catholic, and non-English-speaking people.
An even more profound transformation of the ideal and reality of who was an American citizen came in the late 19th century with the arrival of another 11 million immigrants between 1861 and 1890. These people were even more different in culture, religion, and language than the prior wave—including Eastern European Jews, Southern Italian and Polish Catholics, Greeks and Slavs who were members of the Orthodox Church. By the early 20th century, the eleven largest cities in the U.S. boasted populations that were upwards of 2/3 foreign born and children of immigrants. Though there was spirited debate at the time about whether these new immigrants were culturally and genetically inferior to “old- stock Americans,” all of them were considered racially white. And so there was nothing to stop them, after five years, from becoming citizens. Male immigrants could vote and run for office as soon as they were naturalized. For African Americans, Native Americans, Mexican Americans, Asian Americans, and for all women, the path to full citizenship in the U.S. was longer and rockier—continuing well into 20th century.
For African Americans legal slavery clearly marked the most profound denial of their rights as citizens and human beings. Despite bans on slavery in the northern states, the Fugitive Slave Acts of 1793 and 1850 required that runaway slaves be returned to their masters—clearly asserting that white men’s property rights superseded the God- given right to individual liberty set out by Thomas Jefferson in the opening lines of the Declaration of Independence. Attempts by African Americans to sue for their freedom in the U.S. courts achieved mixed results in the first half of the 19th century. But the 1857 Dred Scott decision made it the law of the land that—as U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Roger Taney put it—African Americans born into slavery were not entitled to sue for their freedom because they were not citizens of the United States. They were first and foremost the property of citizens.
It took four years of civil war, 600,000 dead and a million wounded, to finally enshrine in the American Constitution the principle that all who were born in the U.S. were entitled to equal treatment under the law. That principle was laid out in the 14th Amendment. The 15th Amendment guaranteed that the right to vote would not be restricted on the basis of race, color, or condition of previous servitude. (The right to vote and run for office, however, as well as the right to be counted for representation in Congress, was restricted by sex. No matter what their race, women could neither vote nor run for office. This restriction, laid out in so many words in the 15th Amendment, sparked resentment and disappointment on the part of advocates for woman suffrage who had been deeply involved in the movement to abolish slavery. ) Under the 14th and 15th Amendments, persons of African ancestry also won the right to become naturalized citizens. But the guarantees of the 14th and 15th Amendments lasted only until federal troops withdrew from the old Confederacy in 1877.
In the years immediately following Reconstruction, Jim Crow laws were passed throughout the South mandating separation of the races in education, transportation, and medical care. And the right to vote was restricted by literacy tests, poll taxes, and clauses asserting that you could only vote if your grandfather could, effectively denying the vote to all former slaves. Federal courts ruled that these restrictions, not based on race, were in keeping with the 15th Amendment. And in 1896, in Plessy v. Ferguson, the Supreme Court ruled that segregation of schools and public facilities was legal as long as the separate facilities were equal. Although grandfather clauses were struck down in 1915, Plessy remained the law of the land until the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision that separate is “inherently unequal.” African Americans’ right to vote and to protection from employment or housing discrimination were not restored until Congress passed the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act after a decade of mass civil rights activism—the largest popular protest movement in American history.
Though enacted primarily to protect the voting rights of African Americans, the Voting Rights Act has also been used as a tool by Native Americans whose citizenship rights have been denied in a variety of ways over the past 220 years. The major arguments for denying Native citizenship rights were three-fold: 1) that they were members of foreign nations with which the U.S government had made treaties; 2) that they were hostile and uncivilized and thus needed to be controlled; 3) that they were wards of the state without independent rights. The first and second views were combined in the Supreme Court’s Worcester v. Georgia decision in 1832, in which Chief Justice John Marshall argued that Indian tribes were both dependents and foreign sovereigns. Neither of these notions stopped President Andrew Jackson from deferring to the state of Georgia when it decided to “remove” the Cherokee. Fourteen years later, in U.S. v. Rogers, Justice Taney, later the author of the Dred Scott decision, held that Indians were subject to U.S. law but did not have the rights of citizens. In the 1871 Indian Appropriations Act, Congress annulled the status of Indian tribes as sovereign. Their ambiguous and essentially rightless status was affirmed by the Supreme Court—first in 1884 in Elk v. Wilkins, which ruled that Native Americans, although born in the United States, were not wholly subject to the jurisdiction of the United States government and therefore were not protected by the 14th Amendment guarantee of equal treatment under the law. In 1886, in U.S. v. Kagama, Indians were declared to be completely subject to U.S. federal government authority but still not entitled to federal citizenship rights.
In 1887, at the end of two centuries of wars between Euro-American settlers and North American Indians, a majority in Congress voted that Indians should be given rights if they acculturated to white American norms. The Dawes Severalty Act of 1887 converted all communal tribal lands into individual property allotments. Under this new system, if individual Native Americans renounced their tribal affiliations and their claim to any tribal lands, they could receive 160 acres and full citizenship. According to Dawes, “every Indian born within the territorial limits of the United States who has voluntarily taken up, within said limits, his residence separate and apart from any tribe of Indians therein, and has adopted the habits of civilized life, is hereby declared to be a citizen of the United States, and is entitled to all the rights, privileges, and immunities of such citizens.”
One of those rights, to private property, was observed for Native Americans only in the breach. Most of those who accepted 160-acre individual parcels under the Dawes Act lost them to swindlers aided by state and territorial governments over the next 20 years. Dawes’ breaking up of tribal holdings reduced reservation lands granted by the federal government to native tribes dramatically. In 1887, the tribes had owned about 138 million acres; by 1900 the total acreage in Indian hands had fallen to 78 million. This policy was not reversed until 1934, when the Indian Reorganization Act asserted the importance of perpetuating Indian cultural institutions and permitted surplus lands to be returned to tribal ownership. Suits are ongoing in the 21st century to restore to or compensate tribes for lands lost under the Dawes Act.
In 1924, after a generation of lobbying by Native American groups, President Calvin Coolidge finally signed the Indian Citizenship Act granting all Native Americans born within U.S. borders full citizenship. States routinely ignored this federal guarantee until the 1940 Nationalities Act established a federal minimum standard for Indian rights that states would be obliged to respect. Even so, many states continued to keep Native Americans from voting, using four major arguments. One was the old argument that Indians were under federal guardianship, or were federal "wards," and therefore not independent and competent for voting. The second was that Indians living on reservation lands were residents of their reservation and not of the state (even though the Supreme Court declared all reservation Indians residents of their states in 1881). The third was that Indians did not pay state taxes and, therefore, should not be able to affect revenue decisions. And the fourth was that continued participation in their tribal communities precluded participation in other elections. Idaho, Minnesota, North and South Dakota, among other states, required that Indians relinquish tribal affiliations before they would be allowed to vote. The last legal obstacle was not struck down until 1957, when Utah’s law preventing Native voting was repealed.
Into the 21st century, Native Americans remain the group most likely to encounter obstacles to their voting rights. Recently tightened voter identification requirements discriminate against elderly reservation-dwellers who often do not possess any forms of ID recognized by the federal or state governments. In the 2004 elections numerous examples were reported of poll watchers challenging the registration status of Indian voters. Polls are few and far between on reservations, in some cases as much as 60 miles away from smaller towns. Finally, though Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act guarantees language assistance to qualified voters whose first language is not English, there has been little attempt to provide that assistance for Indian-language speakers at polling places.
For Asian immigrants to the U.S., the struggle for citizenship rights was as long and hard. The Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) banned Chinese immigration to this country. The Geary Act (1892) continued that ban and required that Chinese residents of the U.S., no matter how long they’d lived here, carry government permits whenever they left the house. It also excluded them from testifying in court and denied them the right to bail if arrested. It is worth noting that these laws denied due process rights stemming from English common law. Neither black nor white, Asians continued to be excluded from the right to naturalize by the 1790 Alien Naturalization Act. And they were excluded from the right to vote because they could not become citizens.
Without the vote, people of Asian origins in the U.S. could exert little political influence and continued to suffer legislated denials of rights through the middle of the 20th century. The 1913 California Alien Land Law prevented those “ineligible for citizenship” (Chinese and Japanese) from owning land. The 1924 Oriental Exclusion Act prohibited immigration from all of Asia. This included foreign-born wives and children of American citizens of Chinese ancestry.
In the middle of the 20th century, Japanese immigrants and citizens of Japanese origin experienced the largest wholesale denial of the rights of a single group since slavery: Executive Order 9066, authorizing federal troops to round up and detain them indefinitely. For almost four years, from 1941 to 1945, 116,000 Japanese immigrants and Japanese-American citizens were incarcerated in prison camps without trial or evidence of wrongdoing. Fred Korematsu, a Japanese American who refused the order to be deported from his home, was arrested and took his case to the Supreme Court, charging that the law violated his constitutional rights. The Court ruled in 1944 that concerns of national security superseded individual rights and that the order to deport Japanese Americans was based on security concerns, not racism. The lands and property of these Japanese Americans were confiscated without compensation, effectively robbing them of the central position in California agriculture they had pioneered. What those lands would have been worth now is incalculable.
Exclusions on Asian immigration to the U.S. only began to be lifted in 1943, when the War Brides Act allowed soldiers to bring home to the U.S., with full citizenship rights, foreign nationals whom they had married while stationed overseas. The doors were not open fully to Asian immigration until the landmark immigration reform bill of 1965 passed Congress. Since 1921, in an attempt to stem the tide of immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe, government policy dictated that the annual quota for every national group from outside the Western hemisphere was based on the number of people of that nationality living in the U.S. in 1890.
The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act finally replaced those quotas, which favored immigrants from Northern and Western Europe, with a system that prioritized family reunification and labor needs. With the decolonization of Africa and Asia, and with ongoing competition with the Soviet Union for the hearts and minds of the developing world, the quota system was seen as an embarrassment since it discriminated against all those who did not come from Northern Europe.
The removal of national quotas sparked a demographic revolution in the U.S. 7.3 million immigrants from Asia entered the country between 1971 and 2002, more than twice the number who migrated from Europe during the same period. The only area of the world that sent more people to the U.S. was the one region from which immigration was not shut down in the years between 1921 and 1965—the Western Hemisphere, North and South America. Between 1971 and 2002, approximately 10,300,000 came to the U.S. from Mexico, the Caribbean, and Central and South America.
Among these was the largest national migration to the U.S.—more than 5 million people from Mexico. I want to offer a few thoughts about people of Mexican origin living in the U.S. and their history in relation to citizenship. I can barely begin to do justice to this topic but it is too important to omit entirely.
When the U.S. was ceded 525,000 square miles of northern Mexico in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, making up large parts of what are now the states of Texas, New Mexico, Utah, Arizona, Nevada, California and parts of Wyoming and Colorado, Mexican citizens living in those regions were promised U.S. citizenship. However, full citizenship rights were granted only to about 80,000 former Mexicans in the ceded territories—those who were considered “white.” Though indigenous people and those of mixed blood living in the territories had enjoyed full Mexican citizenship, they were treated as Native Americans under U.S. rule and did not receive full citizenship until 1930. Although the treaty also promised to honor property rights of Mexican citizens who found themselves, after 1848, living within U.S. borders, the reality was far different. When white settlers to the West seeking land challenged Mexican-American property rights in court, the rulings almost invariably favored the newcomers. By the late 19th century, the vast majority of people of Mexican origin living in the western U.S. were landless and reduced to the status of farm laborers.
Though Mexican Americans living in the southwestern U.S. were not subject to the same systematic Jim Crow laws enforcing segregation as were African Americans in the southeast, they were frequently subjected to locally enforced segregation of neighborhoods, schools, and churches, to a form of family-based farm labor that amounted to peonage, and to periodic wholesale deportation efforts by federal and state authorities. During the Great Depression attempts to encourage people to return to Mexico were augmented by roundups and forcible deportations of upwards of 1 million Mexican Americans, more than half of whom were U.S. citizens. It was not until 1947 that the U.S. Supreme Court outlawed segregating children of Mexican and Latin American descent in southwestern public school systems, and not until 1954, in Hernandez v. Texas, that the Supreme Court declared that Mexicans—and all other racial and ethnic minorities in the U.S.—were fully covered by the 14th Amendment guarantee of equal treatment under the law.
Finally, no survey of the history of citizenship in the U.S. is complete without at least a sketch of the evolution of the rights of fully half the population—women. In 1848, when the first national gathering of women’s rights advocates was convened in Seneca Falls, New York, female citizens of the U.S. did not have the right to own property, take out a loan, sue for divorce, claim custody of their children, or seek legal protection from physical assault by their husbands. And, of course, they did not have the right to vote. A married woman had no legal identity apart from her husband; she could not sue or be sued or sign a contract. Over the next 150 years, sustained protest, lobbying, and legislative campaigns earned women all of these rights.
The best known of the women’s rights campaigns was the woman suffrage campaign. American women did not earn the right to vote in the U.S. until 1920, following a 72-year campaign that won local victories in the states beginning in 1870 but no national right until the ratification of the 19th Amendment 50 years later. African-American women in the Jim Crow South continued to be denied that right until the Voting Rights Act in 1965.
In many parts of the U.S. a woman could own no property in her own right well into the 19th century. Until married, her property belonged to her father. Once married it belonged to her husband. Only a widow had any legal claim to property, and this was only 1/3 of her deceased husband’s estate. Beginning in 1848 with the New York State Married Women’s Property Act—which was heavily lobbied for by some of the same women who had organized the Seneca Falls convention—and continuing through the late 19th century, most states passed laws strengthening a woman’s right to control her own property. This trend gained momentum after the Civil War when states sought to prevent creditors from bankrupting families in which the husbands had been absent for four years while serving in the military. So laws passed in the aftermath of the Civil War sought to create equity within marriage when it came to property holdings. Many states continued to place restrictions on women’s ability to take out loans, sign mortgages, or get insurance in their own names into the 1970s. These final restrictions on women’s commercial and property rights were lifted only in the past forty years.
Women’s rights to bodily integrity were won only slowly after the mid-19th century court decisions acquitting husbands for beating their wives if they did not substantially hurt them. Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, women had little legal recourse unless they were seriously injured. In 1867 a North Carolina man was acquitted of assault because the stick he beat his wife with was smaller than his thumb. In 1874 the state supreme court ruled that a husband had no right to chastise his wife, but “if no permanent injury has been inflicted…it is better to draw the curtain, shut out the public gaze and leave the parties to forget and forgive.” That was the prevailing legal view of domestic violence within marriage into the 1980s, when a grassroots movement to support victims of domestic violence began to change American law and police practice. As late as 1996, seven states continued to exempt men from prosecution for raping their wives.
There have been signal victories but they have been eroded. In 1994, after four years of hearings filled with frightening personal and expert testimony documenting the pervasive nature of violence against women, its impact on individual citizens, its links to job and income loss, and the failure of state courts and local police departments to protect women, Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). The “Civil Rights Remedy” of VAWA enabled victims of gender-based violence to sue their assailants in state or federal court for compensatory or punitive damages, injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees.
By 1996, there were 1,200 shelters for battered women in the U.S., many of them receiving funds through the Violence Against Women Act. Battered women’s defense was an accepted though controversial defense for women who attacked their assaulters. The sexual history of a rape victim could no longer be admitted as evidence against her during the trial of her attacker. And many police departments have hired specially trained officers to deal with cases of violence against women. Still, expansions of rights are often followed by contractions. And in 2000, the Supreme Court struck down the Civil Rights Remedy of VAWA, ruling that a woman’s civil rights are not violated by sexual or domestic violence.
Finally, campaigns against employment discrimination on the basis of sex achieved their greatest gains between 1964 and 2000. Section 7A of the 1964 Civil Rights Act put the power of the federal government in opposition to employment discrimination on the basis of sex for the first time. When President Lyndon Johnson created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to evaluate cases of employment discrimination, he did not expect the flood of complaints that followed documenting discrimination on the basis of sex. The 1978 Pregnancy Non-Discrimination Act—a law supported by both conservative women activists and liberal feminists—banned the widespread practice of failing to hire, promote, or retain women who planned to or did become pregnant while on the job.
During the 1980s and ‘90s a series of Supreme Court decisions affirmed a woman’s right to be free of sexual harassment on the job. In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson (1986) the Court decided that sexual harassment was a form of employment discrimination that could be the basis for a valid claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. In 2007 alone the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and related state agencies received 12,510 new charges of sexual harassment on the job.
Notably, the first bill President Barack Obama signed into law in January 2009 reflects the continued jockeying back and forth between Congress and the Supreme Court over issues of expanding rights—in this case regarding women. Pay discrimination on the basis of sex was one of the forms of employment discrimination outlawed under the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The Ledbetter Fair Pay Act was named for Lily Ledbetter, who sued Goodyear Tire for pay discrimination beginning in the 1980s and then had her case make its way to the Supreme Court. In 2006, the Court made it harder for many workers to sue their employers for pay discrimination by limiting the time they had to bring a case. Congress passed the Ledbetter Act in 2007, but President Bush vetoed the bill. In 2008, it passed the bill again, putting it on a brand new president’s desk in January 2009.
The brief histories sketched above do not purport to be comprehensive in any way, but try to give a sense of the complexity and political passion generated on both sides by campaigns to extend citizenship rights.

Thursday, July 16, 2015

THE STRUGGLE FOR JURISDICTION OVER PROCEDURE I

   Several useful and important articles have been published on this subject since this article was drafted. 

So, it is not the last, or even most important, reference, for this group of topics, even in this one state.         

THE STRUGGLE FOR JURISDICTION OVER PROCEDURE IN FLORIDA

                                                                    PART ONE

I.                                                           INTRODUCTION

          Jurisdiction over procedure has been one of the main frontiers of conflict and accommodation between the judiciary and the legislature for over 30 years.  The Supreme Court has now long claimed exclusive jurisdiction over procedure. The legislature has often failed to acknowledge, and sometimes to accept, this claim.  Important constitutional questions involving the proper powers of these branches of government are at stake.     More practically, lawyers in many fields have long been confounded by the need to reconcile statutory procedures with discrepant or conflicting rules of court. 
          This article summarizes and comments upon modern legislative and judicial efforts to control jurisdiction over procedure in Florida, with special reference to civil procedure, and deals with existing scholarship on this subject. Its scope requires that it can be only a survey of the topic.
      This subject overlaps many areas including state constitutional law, legislation and litigation in disparate fields, and public policy issues.  These areas will be discussed to the extent necessary to illuminate developments in jurisdiction over procedure.  
     Part I covers the subject from the early 20th Century up to 1973, generally follows a chronological account, including exegesis and criticism of existing scholarship, statutory and decisional law, and contains topical treatment of issues necessary for an account of the ground of the Supreme Court=s assertion of exclusive jurisdiction over procedure.


                            HISTORY OF JURISDICTION OVER PROCEDURE
      A court rule is a judicial order directed against all persons within its scope. 
      Prior to the 1920s, judicial rulemaking in Florida was limited to administrative matters, administration of the bar, and regulation of court business, because such matters were considered within the inherent powers of courts by virtue of the constitutional separation of powers.1 
     Nationally, the movement away from legislative control over procedure came with federal reforms in the 1930s.  The rationale for greater judicial control over rulemaking has been summarized as follows:
Legislatures have neither the immediate familiarity with the day-to-day practice of the courts which would allow them to isolate the pressing problems of procedural revision nor the experience and expertness necessary to the solution of these problems; legislatures are intolerably slow to act and cause even the slightest and most obviously necessary matter of procedural change to be long delayed; legislatures are subject to the influence of other pressures than those which seek the efficient administration of justice and may often push through some particular and ill-advised pet project of an influential legislator while the comprehensive, long-studied proposal of a bar association molders on committee; and legislatures are not held responsible in the public eye for the efficient administration of the courts and hence do not feel pressed to constant reexamination of procedural methods.  Moreover, it must be remembered that a very large part of maintaining maximum effectiveness in the courts does not lie in drastic wholesale procedural reform, but in the necessary minor alterations of single rules from time to time as experience dictates, and such small matters as these inevitably fare badly when they must compete for legislative attention. 
   
 William  L. Earl  summarized the early history of rulemaking reform in Florida as follows:
Basically, Florida followed the national pattern of rulemaking reform, but a decided judicial reluctance to exercise existing rulemaking powers resulted in what has been termed a checkered history@ of procedural reforms.  In 1940 the Florida supreme court held its inherent powers did not encompass the power to promulgate civil rules of procedure patterned after the federal rules.  Petition of Florida State Bar Assn., 145 Fla. 223, 199 So. 57 (Fla. 1940).  Despite intervening passage of an enabling act, the court in 1945 again rejected an opportunity to promulgate civil rules of procedure. Petition of Florida State Bar Assn., 155 Fla. 710, 21 So.2d 605 (Fla. 1945). Id. p. 88. 2

     In 1955, two years prior to the first express constitutional grant of rulemaking authority to the Supreme Court, the legislature authorized the Court to promulgate rules for practice and procedure in all courts, and such rules were to prevail over any statutes with which they conflicted. 3


     The Supreme Court obtained express constitutional rulemaking authority for the first time in 1957.  Section 3 of new Article V provided: “The practice and procedure in all courts shall be governed by rules adopted by the Supreme Court”.  This 1957 wording was subsequently held in 1960 to have vested exclusive jurisdiction over procedure in the Supreme Court. 4   
     However, previous commentators in 1971 and 1980,  Earl and Ernest Means, believed that it was never so held by the Supreme Court during the time this provision was in force. 5   These authors were apparently, and perhaps suspiciously, unaware of, and failed to cite, Bluesten.   The 1957 Article V was subsequently interpreted to have vested exclusive jurisdiction in the Supreme Court in In re Clarification of Florida Rules of Practice and Procedure (Florida Constitution, Article V, Section 2(a)), 281 So.2d 204 (Fla. 1973). 6
     Earl’s Article, appearing in 1971, found the scope of the 1957 constitutional grant of procedure problematic. He did not acknowledge that it exclusive jurisdiction, but suspected that it might have.  He had concerns that it was not clearly limited, that the rulemaking power is inherently uncontrollable”, and that the legislature had no express constitutional authority over procedures. 7
     Nevertheless, most procedural legislation after the 1957 revision, and the Bluestendecision, went unchallenged by the Court and belied exclusive judicial jurisdiction, resulting in apparent de facto shared jurisdiction from 1957 to 1973. 8  
    Additionally, the Court failed to adopt rules for several clearly procedural areas during this period, a fact which has been construed as evidence that it did not exercise exclusive jurisdiction.9  
     The Court generally held during the 1957 to 1973 period that rules ‘superseded’ statutes to the extent of conflict between them.  10


      The Court also during this period continued to defer to Aspecial statutory procedures@ under Rule 1.010 where these procedures were claimed to conflict with other rules.  For example, the year after the Court’s constitutional rulemaking authority was made express, Harley v. Bd. of  Public Instruction of Duval County, 103 So.2d 111, (Fla. 1958), dealt with a conflict between a special statutory procedure, a general law,  and Rule A of the 1954 Rules, over the time within which to file a  petition for certiorari. The terms of the special statutory provision were held to control over the general law and over the conflicting Rule, based on the exception found in Rule 1.010.
     The applicability of the 1954 Rules, and subsequent Rules, has been restricted with respect to “special statutory procedures”.  Rule1.010 provides in part, “These rules apply to ...all special statutory proceedings....The form, content, procedure, and time for pleading in all special statutory proceedings shall be as prescribed by the statutes governing the proceeding unless these rules specifically provide to the contrary.”  
The reason for restricting the applicability of the rules with respect to statutory proceedings is evident.  Florida has in its statutes many special proceedings, such as eminent domain and bond validation, in which each step is clearly specified.  The form of the pleadings required therein is relatively simple, and the time for filing them is greatly accelerated as compared to the old common law system of procedure.  Modification thereof by general rules is accordingly unnecessary, and might well produce undesired results in practice.  11

     Earl summarized the 1960s history of rulemaking reform in Florida as follows:
   Modern rules of civil procedure, abolishing the distinction between law and equity, were not adopted by the Florida supreme court until 1967, eleven years after its investiture with constitutional rulemaking authority.  The court’s entrance into criminal rulemaking was the response to the United States Supreme court’s directive in Gideon v. Wainwright.  Criminal Rule 1 was adopted to avoid chaos by regulating the administration of post-conviction relief proceedings of indigent defendants, which Gideon held had been denied the right to appointed counsel.  The first comprehensive body of criminal rules was not implemented in Floridauntil 1968.  Since most were patterned after existing procedural statutes, they did not represent an aggressive or innovative assertion of the court’s authority. 12



     In 1967 The Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated.  The order adopting the rules, In Re: Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1967 Revision, 187 So.2d 598 (Fla.), provided A all statutes not superseded by the rules or in conflict with the rules shall remain in effect as rules promulgated by the Supreme Court.@ 
     What might be characterized as ‘discretionary’ judicial deference to special statutory procedures remained intact under Rule 1.010.
     The wording, “...shall remain in effect...”, also contained in the 1967 Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, suggested that the legislature continued to have procedural authority in these fields: 
a judicial determination that procedural statutes remain effective as court rules does not negate the fact that legislative revision of such statutes implies an affirmative legislative role in the regulation of practice and procedure.  If the constitutional rulemaking power of the court is in fact exclusive, such legislative actions may be unconstitutional. 13


THE STRUGGLE FOR JURISDICTION OVER PROCEDURE II

SUBSTANCE VERSUS PROCEDURE
      By 1960, the same year in which Bluesten was decided, the Court adopted a 'substantive right' rationale for its delineation of the boundaries between substantive and procedural law. This rationale’s foundation is that the separation of powers clause implicitly prohibits rulemaking that abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right. 14
     The Supreme Court has defined procedural laws by contrast with substantive laws. Application  of the substantive right rationale to determine the scope of judicial rulemaking has been based in practice on definitions that distinguish procedure and substance: “The validity of  (a rule)  turns on the meaning of  ‘practice and procedure’ in relation to the courts.” 15
     In In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So.2d 65 (Fla. 1972), in Justice Adkins’ Concurring opinion, cited in In re Clarification, Id., the Court defined ‘procedure’.  Under Justice Adkins’ definition, the domain of procedure is broad:


Practice and procedure encompass the course, form, manner, means, method, mode, order, process  or steps by which a party enforces substantive rights or obtains redress for their invasion.  “Practice and procedure” may be described as the machinery of the judicial process as opposed to the product thereof.   16 

     Earl described the problem of determining the confines of practice and procedure.  The prevalent view earlier in the century had suggested a broad ‘twilight zone’ in which procedural and substantive law were virtually indistinguishable.
      Earl argued, as virtually all writers have, that the substance/procedure distinction is unhelpful,  existing definitions are not useful, and the distinction is misleading except in a few self  evident instances. 17
     Nevertheless, for reasons to be further explored, the Court adopted a sharp distinction between substance and procedure, between substantive rights versus rules, as a way of distinguishing governmental functions and powers.
II.                                   SUPREME COURT VERSUS LEGISLATURE : 
                     IN RE CLARIFICATION OF FLORIDA RULES OF PRACTICE AND
                 PROCEDURE (FLORIDA  CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE V, SECTION 2(a))

     The 1971 Legislature proposed a constitutional  revision, effective January 1, 1973.  Sec.2(a) of the new Article V vested rulemaking authority as follows:
The supreme court shall adopt rules for the practice and procedure in all courts ....  These rules may be repealed by general law enacted by two-thirds vote of the membership of each house of the legislature.”


     Shortly after adoption of this constitutional amendment, the legislature enacted several statutes which were obviously procedural in nature.  In declaring these statutes unconstitutional, the Supreme Court in In re Clarification essentially reiterated its position in Bluesten,  supra., without citing it, that its jurisdiction over procedure was  exclusive, in spite of  the new  repeal provision: “The legislature has the constitutional right to repeal any rule of the Supreme Court by a two-thirds vote, but it has no constitutional authority to enact any law relating to practice and procedure.  See State v. Smith and Figgers, 260 So.2d 489 (Fla. 1972).” Id. at 204.  The Court thus expressly excluded the legislature from lawmaking in the area of procedure.
     The holding explicitly divested the legislature of procedural jurisdiction over all laws it had previously enacted.  Procedural portions of these laws could no longer be amended by the Legislature, and were, as it were, ‘frozen in time’.  Means described some of the practical problems with blanket adoption:
Blanket adoption fails to inform practitioners of which statutes have been so adopted.  Nevertheless, those adopted are supposedly thereafter removed from the power of the legislature to amend....The statutory sections continue to be published in the Florida Statutes.  The user has no way of knowing whether a particular section has been superseded or continued as a rule.  More importantly, the legislature has no way of knowing whether a particular section is subject to amendment or appeal.  It has even been conjectured that a particular statute may have been superseded in part and continued in part by such blanket adoption.  Even with specific adoptions, it is possible for the court to change its mind as to whether a particular matter is substantive or procedural. 18



     In re Clarification overruled Ch 73-72 which purported to amend Fl. St. 53.051, a statute which the Court asserted it had previously adopted as a rule by promulgating the 1967 revision of the Rules. The Court stated “the 1967 adoption as rules of the court of all statutes which have not been superseded or may be in conflict with the rules is primarily a matter of convenience or administrative expediency.  Such adoption avoids the question of whether a matter lies within the field of substantive law or procedural law”.   The characterization of the effect of adoption as ‘mere expedience or convenience’ misrepresents its actual consequences, as the Court’s subsequent reasoning bears out: adoption is an assertion that a statute is procedural.   Far from ‘avoiding’ decisions on substance versus procedure, blanket adoption decides matters to be procedural and brings them permanently under judicial rather than legislative jurisdiction (unless legislatively vetoed).  All that blanket adoption avoids is the spelling out of which matters have been brought under the Court' exclusive jurisdiction.   The Court’s further holding bears this out: “The fact that this Court may adopt a statute as a rule does not vest the Legislature with any authority to amend the rule indirectly by amending the statute.  In other words, an attempt by the Legislature to amend a statute which has become a part of rules of practice and procedure would be a nullity.” 
     The Court at this point was discussing a statute which had been adopted by Rule in 1967 under the 1957 grant of rule making authority.  A plain reading of the opinion indicates that the Court was asserting in 1973 that this 1967 adoption as a rule had worked exclusive jurisdiction over this statute under the former, 1957, grant. As this article has shown, this reasoning was merely consistent with its prior holding in Bluestenin 1960.
     Means, writing as a partisan against exclusive jurisdiction in 1980, claimed that D’Alembert, the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, ‘mistakenly’ considered the Court’s jurisdiction to be already exclusive in 1971. 19   However, the language of the 1957 grant lent itself to interpretation as an exclusive grant.  Id. p. 447.   Furthermore, D’Alembert was working in 1971 on a constitutional revision intended by him to check the Court’s jurisdiction precisely because no check was thought by the legislature to exist.  Finallythe In re Clarification Court in effect acknowledged that its jurisdiction had been exclusive since 1957, a fact then long indicated in Bluesten.  Put another way, its hindsight that its jurisdiction had become exclusive in 1957 became “20/20” in 1973.  If, as Means asserted, D’Alemberte was mistaken in believing the Supreme Court’s procedural jurisdiction was exclusive in 1973, D’Alemberte was nevertheless in very good company.   


       Means analyzed whether In re Clarification rested on the 1973 revision of article V.  He reported that the revision=s proponents did not intend this result, and that the Court had not relied on the 1973 constitutional revision for its holding. Id p. 467. This conclusion is reflected in Broward County v. Surette, 281 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1973), issued the same day as In re Clarification, dealing with a joinder statute found to be in conflict with a rule.  Surette did not refer to In re Clarification or rely on it, but relied instead on the 1957 grant for holding Fl. St. 455.06(2) unconstitutional, stating that "the revised Art. V, effective January 1, 1973, contains a similar provision in Art. V, s. 2(a)." 20
      Means found ‘implied’ support for the In re Clarification holding in three rationales:
1) that absence of an express grant of  legislative authority over practice and procedure implies an intent that the legislature shall not have such authority; 2) that the authority to regulate practice and procedure cannot coexist in both the court and the legislature, and an express grant was made to the court; or 3) that application of the maxim expressio unius est exclusion alterius to one or the other of the components of the constitutional grant of rulemaking authority implies that the legislature is to be excluded from the regulation of practice and procedure.  21

     Means found all of the  these grounds to be inadequate.  His answer to:
     1) above is that, as to the legislature, a state constitution is a limitation not a grant of authority, and the legislature possesses all authority not expressly or impliedly denied by the constitution.  He claimed that the legislature’s rule making authority was never challenged prior to 1973.
     2) above is rebutted by an ‘argument from history’: the authority coexisted in both branches throughout the history of the state until 1973.  
     3) above is rebutted by the explanation that the maxim should be used only in ascertaining true meaning, and not as a rigid rule of universal application, especially where there is a rational alternative explanation for a provision.  Means found rational alternative explanations for the 1973 grant not excluding legislative rule making.

     However, Means’ analysis under all three is somewhat confounded by his failure to cite or interpret Bluesten.   22

THE STRUGGLE FOR JURISDICTION OVER PROCEDURE III

THE BASIS FOR EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION


     What was the Court's assertion of exclusive jurisdiction in In re Clarification based on?   It was based in part on the fact that the Court had concluded that the wording of the 1957 grant had vested it with exclusive jurisdiction.  Why had it come to believe this, and how is this related to the 1973 holding? After all, the interpretation of exclusive jurisdiction did not follow from the wording of the 1973 revision:  to say the Supreme Court ‘shall’ does not necessarily mean that the legislature ‘cannot’.
      One important basis for the Court’s In re Clarification rationale, alluded to by both Earl and Means, is the fact that legislative authority over procedure is not spelled out in the constitution, whereas since 1957 the Supreme Court’s authority had been.  The Supreme Court subsequently expressly inferred, from this absence of an express grant to the legislature, that the legislature has no constitutional authority over procedure. 23   Although Means considered this inference to be far fetched, he failed to address, other than by a hollow ‘argument from history’ under 2) above, how the express grant to the Court in 1957 did not by implication deny authority over procedure to the legislature. He also failed to address the larger fact that the express 1957 grant rendered prior jurisdictional history obsolete.
                                       THE SEPARATION OF POWERS CLAUSE
     Clearly, an important but implicit element of the In re Clarification rationale was  the Separation of Powers clause:
The powers of the state government shall be divided into legislative, executive, and judicial branches.  No person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly provided herein.24

     The views of Chief Justice B.K. Roberts were instrumental in fashioning the 1973 revision. 25
He had a strong separation of powers perspective.  Regarding one proposal for revision, he said:
Frankly, I am opposed to the proposal as outlined because it tends to make the Judicial Branch almost entirely subservient to the Legislature.  My concept of government is that it is divided between the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches and that each is to a large degree autonomous.  The legislature prescribes the rules for its operation, the Cabinet prescribes the rules of operation for the Executive, and the Supreme court prescribes the rules for the Judicial, and frankly, I do not believe there is any more logic in having the Legislature write the rules for the Judiciary than there would be in having the Supreme Court write the rules for the Legislature.26



      Though not explicitly cited, the separation of powers requirement also explains the reference in In re Clarification to State v. Smith and Figgerssupra., a case holding a statute authorizing interlocutory appeals from pretrial orders unconstitutional since jurisdiction to entertain such appeals may be granted only by rule of the Supreme Court, under art.V, s 5(3),. What better example of what J. Roberts referred to above as an attempt to have “...the legislature write the rules for the judiciary?”         
       In re Clarification made quite explicit the separation between the legislative and judicial branches of government based on the separation between their respective powers to regulate subject matters, correspondingly divided into the mutually exclusive domains of substantive and procedural law: “The distinction between practice and procedure, which is regulated by the Supreme Court and substantive law which is regulated by the Legislature, is discussed in a concurring opinion, In re; Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure....” 27    
                                          THE 'PUBLIC POLICY' DIMENSION
     What other tendencies affecting the distribution of governmental functions influenced the In re Clarification opinion?
          Means’ polemical articles claimed that what he called ‘Democratic Principle’ assigns the primary role in determining public policy to the legislature, and that In re Clarification was on a collision course with the Democratic Principle to the extent that public policy issues are as likely to be procedural as substantive. 28
      He described and criticized the Court’s ‘expanding’ role in determining public policy issues, citing Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So.2d 713 (Fla. 1969), in which the Court had construed an existing rule to authorize direct actions by insurers against their insured tortfeasors in part by ‘weighing and measuring certain countervailing public policies,’ and in which public policy was characterized as “...a molding device available to the judicial process by which changing realities and the attending manifested rules of fair play may be incorporated into our corpus juris.” 29    


     Means quoted Justice Frankfurter regarding the relationship of policy to procedure in judicial rulemaking as follows:
...the history of American freedom is, in no small measure, the history of procedure....some clearly procedural rules are of such great general significance that they should not be modified except by a procedure, such as legislation or constitutional revision, that involves general political assent.  The right to jury trial, for example, is in this category.
     The proper boundaries of the rulemaking power must therefore be worked out by processes that go beyond strict legal definitions. 30

     If some rules are so important that they should not be modified except by general political assent, this arguably presents an area of rulemaking lying preponderantly within legislative control.               Means' criticism of the Court’s substantive rights rationale is valid to the extent that the substance/ procedure dichotomy leaves no middle ground in the area of rules having policy implications.        
     However, Means’ criticism, made in isolation from other related trends, that judicial jurisdiction  over procedure has been unreasonably expanding at the legislature=s expense, tells only part of the story, and fails notably to discuss possible causes for this trend.
       Many factors have increased the tendency toward legislative solutions for matters once controlled by case law: the modernization of society, increasingly specialized institutions, powerful interest group legislation, consumerism and consumer protection, broader police power and public policy regulations, and other influences.  
     Portions of fields of “substantive” law, such as tort for example, once controlled almost exclusively by the judiciary, have become, after “tort reform” began, the subjects of legislation specifying rights and remedies, as well as rules of procedure. 
Thus, although Earl had characterized the rule making power as “inherently uncontrollable”; on the other hand, the law making power, exercised to some extent at the expense of historic judicial subject matter prerogatives, has shown itself to be so as well.
            This trend, toward greater legislative control over fields of law historically controlled by the judiciary, may in part account for a trend toward moderating, then toward eliminating, judicial deference. 


          In my view, it is partly within the context of, and in reaction against, this seemingly inexorable tendency, to shift power over substantive law from the judiciary toward the legislature, that the Court’s claim to exclusive jurisdiction over procedure arose, and should be scrutinized.    
                      SUMMARY OF ANTECEDENTS TO IN RE CLARIFICATION
Societal trends, constitutional law issues, inferences from case law, and separation of powers rivalry, have been invoked to try to explain the Supreme Court’s position on its jurisdiction over procedure. 
     Greater judicial control over procedure in Florida began slowly, originally as a response to federal criminal procedural reform. 


     During the 1960s, trends in several different fields developed and converged.  In state constitutional law, the legislature extended control at the expense of the judiciary over areas of law traditionally governed by common law stare decisis.  The policy of  judicial deference to acts of the legislature weakened.  The substantive right rationale was increasingly used by the judiciary to define and divide functions of the legislative and judicial branches of government differently and more rigorously, and to assert that procedural areas were constitutionally off limits to lawmakers.   The separation of powers clause played a new and greater role for the judiciary in defining the nature and extent of its domain against ‘encroachment’ by the legislature.  The legislature took steps to limit 1957 rulemaking jurisdiction previously vested in the Supreme Court, and relations between these two branches of government grew more adversarial and tactical during this time. 
Ultimately, when the legislature formulated the 1973 Article V amendment partly to check ‘unfettered’ judicial jurisdiction over procedure, the Court responded not only that it continued to have exclusive jurisdiction, but strongly hinted that the ground of its exclusive jurisdiction included not just Article V but also the separation of powers clause in Article II.   
1. See generally: W. L. Earl, The Rulemaking Power of the Florida Supreme Court: The Twilight Zone Between Substance and Procedure, U. Fla. L. Rev. Vol. 24, 1971, p. 87 at 88.  
2. Levin & AmsterdamIn EarlId. p. 443 n. 12.
3.1955 Fla. Laws 262, ch. 29737; see E. Means, The Power to Regulate Practice and Procedure in Florida Courts, Fla. B. J., Vol.54, Num.4, April, 1980, p 442.
4. Bluesten v. Florida Real Estate Comm., 125 So.2d 567 (Fla. 1960).
5. Means, Id., p. 277; Earl, Id. at 94; Florida Law Revision Commission, Study of Criminal Law and Procedure of Florida 62 (Tallahassee, n.d.(1970).
6. See infra; Broward County v. Surette, 281 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1973).
7. Id. pp. 94, 95.
8. See generally: E. Means, The Power to Regulate Practice and Procedure in Florida Courts, 32 U. Fla. L. Rev. (1980), 442, at 447, 461.
9. Earl. Id. pp. 94, 95.
10 Means, Id., p.277; EarlId., p. 94; See: Jaworski v. City of Opa-Locka, 149 So.2d 33 (Fla. 1963); Garcia v. State, 229 So.2d 236 (Fla. 1969); Barton v. State, 193 So.2d 618, 626 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1967).   
11. Re Florida Common Law Rule 61, J. T. Wigginton, ANew Florida Common Law Rules,@ 3 U. Fla. L. Rev.. 1 (1950), cited in Wesley Constr. Co. v. Yarnell, 268 So.2d 454, at 455, (Fla. 4th DCA 1972).
12. Earl Id. p. 90.
13. Id. p. 95.
14. Id., p. 91; State v. Furen, 118 So.2d 6, 11(Fla. 1960).
15. State v. Furensupra., EarlId. at 93.        
16. See also: the discussion of the definition of practice and procedure in State v. Furen, 118 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1960).
17. EarlId.
18. Means Id p. 472.
19. MeansId. p. 466.
20. SuretteId. p. 482 n.1
21. Id p. 459.  
22. Id p. 459-461.
23. Gonzalez v. Badcock=Home Furnishings Center, 343 So.2d 7, 8 (Fla. 1977).  See also Carmel v. Carmel, 282 So.2d 9, 10 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1973).
24.  Fl. Const., art. II, sec. 3.
25. MeansId. p. 466.
26. Id. p. 466; see p. 467 n.164.
27. See also, State v. Furen, supra.
28. Means Id p. 476, 477. 
29. Shingleton at 715.
30. MeansId. P. 477.

RATHER LIKE BRITAIN RAMMING SHIT UP AUSTRIA'S ASS FOR GENERATIONS 18TH TO 20TH C

Traditionally, Britain to Austria: "If you don't cooperate with us now, against our present enemy du jour, France, Prussia, Russia, Germany, and or Bavaria, we will team up with your other enemy among these against you; or else ram a Democratic Jacobin revolt up your asses in Italy, Belgium, and or the Balkans; or we will do both!" See e g, Palmer, The Age of the Democratic Revolution; Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics; Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War


"...We have sort of singlehandedly sealed Europe's and especially the EU's, fate, baby!

They must think we are truly some kind of wonderful!

Then, if they balk at being Muslim migrant queered like that by us, we ram our bleeding heart liberal human rights complaints up their aching asses!

Which do you want to bleed more, Europe, your hearts or your asses? Take your pick. We gotcha either way!"

TIP OF ICEBERG FORCIBLY DISPLACED PEOPLE 2014 60 MILLION



See European migrant crisis, Wikipedia

60 Million, back at the end of 2014.
Imagine what the number stands at now, 4 or 5 years later.

Our gratuitous Middle East Wars have been, and keep on, ramming these bastards right up Europe's ass!

That is the big picture take away from 
American foreign policy over there and in Europe.

It is called queering your so called allies. Your own civilizational kin. 

Call it the Doomsday Pivot

We have sort of singlehandedly sealed Europe's and especially the EU's, fate, baby!

They must think we are truly some kind of wonderful!

Then, if they balk at being Muslim migrant queered like that by us, we ram our bleeding heart liberal human rights complaints up their aching asses!

Which do you want to bleed more, Europe, your hearts or your asses? Take your pick. We gotcha either way!

RATHER A NICE MIX OF PAGEVIEWS TODAY what happened to Portugal?

EntryPageviews
France
30
United States
29
Russia
10
Algeria
8
Poland
4
India
2
Canada
1
Estonia
1
Georgia
1
Greece
1

US BANK STRESS TESTS DEUTSCHE FLUNK MOST US PASS GRIFTER NATION

How tough do you think the test is?

They could be toppled by an aggressive kitten!

They are back in mortgage backed tranches.

REITs.

ETFs.

Goldman, Morgan share buybacks, dividends. 

Real healthy stuff.

Fractional reserve banking baby.

Printing press fiat currency.

Hoarding printing press paper. 

Rather like hoarding old newspapers.

Forget about metal backing.

Bitcoin.

Friday, July 24, 2015

THE MODERN STATE OF ISRAEL AMONG CIVILIZATIONS

One of the great blunders, among many, during and after WWI, for which the British were primarily responsible.

SEE also Huntington, The Clash, pb p 48n.

Tuesday, July 14, 2015

RE SUBSTANTIVE dp

The separation of powers structure itself started the branches off onto a bad foot to begin with, setting the stage for later introducing distinctions, such as this, that have not been helpful.

Bailyn's The Origins contains some useful analyses pointing to problems ahead for the American system yet to come, as distinguished from the English political and social system then in place.

Sunday, July 26, 2015

THE MIDDLE EAST FOR IDIOTS

Syria Sunni

Iraq mostly Shia

Turks Sunni

Iran Shia

Saudia Arabia Sunni

Israel Jewish

USA Jewish but playing four sides

Nuclear Umbrella terms search: Mary Poppins

JORDAN PETERSON WASTE OF TIME

I sometimes cite to social science authors, such as Randall Collins in Sociology.

Here, I simply note a psychologist to not bother with.