Looking back through Bobbitt, I find an interesting passage in Constitutional Fate, p 86, 87, discussing Bickel's The Morality of Consent, a chapter called Structural Argument, (although the decision has normally been seen, including by DK, as an historical one, or perhaps as he says a right wing originalist one).
Here it seems to be squibbed as an example of structuralist jurisprudence, and we see Bobbitt concluding that Justice Taney in Dred Scott was perhaps tragically, as he put it, not so far from wrong.
I fail to see it as tragical. I think Taney was quite right, and very thorough, with a few caveats in some details. I still have to read the dissents. He seems not to have known that Indians were enslaved too.
It seems both originalist and structuralist at the same time, not so hard to grasp really.
Maybe more a structural than an originalist one, given its topics in detail, in my judgment.
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